We study the monotonicity properties of solutions in the classic problem of fair cake-cutting -dividing a heterogeneous resource among agents with different preferences. Resource-and population-monotonicity relate to scenarios where the cake, or the number of participants who divide the cake, changes. It is required that the utility of all participants change in the same direction: either all of them are better-off (if there is more to share) or all are worse-off (if there is less to share). We formally introduce these concepts to the cake-cutting setting and study several division rules. We prove that the Nash optimal rule, which maximizes the product of utilities, is Pareto-optimal, envy-free, resourcemonotonic and population-monotonic. We derive this result in two ways: once directly, and once by showing that the Nash optimal rule is equivalent to the rule of competitive-equilibrium-from-equal-incomes. Moreover, we prove that it is the only rule among a natural family of welfare-maximizing rules that is both proportional and resource-monotonic. In contrast, other members of this family, like the utilitarian and leximin rules, are either not proportional or not resource-monotonic.
Introduction
The interest in monotonicity axioms was motivated by paradoxes such as the throw-away paradox (Aumann and Peleg, 1974) : in some cases an agent can improve his final utility by discarding some goods from the initial endowment. Such apparent paradoxes occur in real life too. Farmers may want to burn crops in order to increase their market-price. Port workers may object to the government's plan of building a new port, as this may create competition to their services. In all these cases, there are agents who are worse-off when the cake is larger. Such agents have an incentive to destroy a part of the cake (or at least prevent growth) in order to improve their well-being.
This problem motivated the so called resource-monotonicity (RM) axiom (Moulin and Thomson, 1988) . Resource-monotonicity (sometimes termed aggregate monotonicity), requires that when new resources are added, and the same division rule is used consistently, the utility of all agents should weakly increase. A related axiom is population-monotonicity (PM). It is concerned with changes in the number of participants. It requires that when someone leaves the division process and abandons his share, the utility of the remaining participants should weakly increase. Conversely, when a new agent joins the process, all existing participants have to make sacrifices in order to support the new agent, thus their utility weakly decreases.
The present paper studies these two monotonicity requirements in the framework of the classic fair cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948) , where a single heterogeneous resource -such as land or time -has to be divided fairly. Fair cake-cutting protocols can be applied in inheritance cases and divorce settlements. They can be also used to divide broadcast time of advertisements and priority access time for customers of an Internet service provider (Caragiannis et al., 2011; Procaccia, 2015) .
The notion of fairness in cake-cutting is commonly restricted to two properties: proportionality means that each of the n agents should receive a value of at least 1/n of the total cake value; envy-freeness means that each agent weakly prefers his share over the share of any other agent. Monotonicity axioms have not been adapted so far for the cake-cutting literature. Indeed, they are violated by all classic fair-cake-cutting procedures that we checked. For example, the classic cut-and-choose protocol is proportional but not resource-monotonic 1 (Section 3.3). It is easy to find monotonic rules that are not proportional (e.g. the rule that gives the entire cake to a pre-specified agent). Our goal in this paper is to find division rules that satisfy all fairness axioms simultaneously.
We start with a positive result: the rule of Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) is RM and PM, while also satisfying the classical fairness properties of proportionality and envy-freeness (Section 4). This solves an open question posed by Berliant et al. (1992) 2 In order to check if there are other rules with these nice properties, we investigate two natural families of welfare-maximizing rules -rules that maximize a certain sum related to the absolute and the relative values of the agents. These families include, as special cases, the utilitarian rule (maximizing the sum of utilities) and the Nash-optimal rule (maximizing the product of utilities), and have the leximin rule (maximizing the smallest utility, then the second-smallest, 1 In an accompanying technical report we provide similar examples showing that other classic cake-cutting procedures, like Banach-Knaster, Dubins-Spanier and many others, violate both RM and PM.
2 "...there are a number of important issues that should be tackled next pertaining, in particular, to the existence of selections from the no-envy solution satisfying additional properties, Examples are monotonicity with respect to the amount to be divided (all agents should benefit from such an increase), and with respect to changes in the number of claimants (all agents initially present should lose in such circumstances)." (Berliant et al., 1992) etc.) on their boundary. We prove necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonicity and proportionality. Based on these conditions, we prove that the Nash-optimal rule is the only essentially-single-valued rule in these families that is both resource-monotonic and proportional (Section 5). We tie the knots by proving that the two ideal rules -the CEEI rule and the Nash-optimal ruleare one and the same (Section 6).
Finally, we show that the leximin rule is either proportional (if relative values are used) or resource-monotonic (if absolute values are used), but not both.
Two other works, published independently and contemporaneously to our work, prove other desirable properties of the Nash-optimal rule for indivisible item assignment (Caragiannis et al., 2016) and for homogeneous resource allocation (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2016) . The combined evidence of the three works shows that the Nash-optimal rule may be the most fair allocation rule in various settings 3 .
Related Work
The cake-cutting problem originates from the work of the polish mathematician Hugo Steinhaus and his students Banach and Knaster (Steinhaus, 1948) . Their primary concern was how to divide the cake in a fair way. Since then, game theorists analyzed the strategic issues related to cake-cutting, while computer scientists were focusing mainly on how to compute solutions efficiently.
Monotonicity issues have been extensively studied with respect to cooperative game theory (Calleja et al., 2012) , political representation (Balinski and Young, 1982) , computer resource allocation (Ghodsi et al., 2011) and other fair division problems. Extensive reviews of monotonicity axioms can be found in chapters 3, 6 and 7 of (Moulin, 2004) and in chapter 7 of Thomson (2011) . To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first that studies these properties in a cake-cutting setting.
Experimental studies show that people value certain fairness criteria more than others. Herreiner and Puppe (2009) demonstrated that people are willing to sacrifice Pareto-efficiency in order to reach an envy-free allocation. To our knowledge no study was ever conducted to unfold the relationship between monotonicity and efficiency or proportionality. However some indirect evidence points toward that monotonicity of the solution is in some cases as important as proportionality. The so called apportionment problem, where electoral seats have to be distributed among administrative regions provides the most notorious examples. The seat distribution of the US House of Representatives generated many monotonicity related anomalies in the last two centuries. The famous Alabama-paradox, as well as the later discovered population and new state paradoxes pressed the legislators to adopt newer and newer apportionment rules. The currently used seat distribution method is free from such anomalies, however it does not satisfy the so called Hare-quota, a basic guarantee of proportionality (Balinski and Young, 1975) . We view this as an evidence that monotonicity is as important fairness axiom as the classic axioms of proportionality and envy-freeness. Thomson (1997) defines the replacement principle, which requires that, whenever any change happens in the environment, the welfare of all agents not responsible for the change should be affected in the same direction -they should all be made at least as well off as they were initially or they should all be made at most as well off. This is the most general way of expressing the idea of solidarity among agents. The PM and RM axioms are special cases of this principle.
The consistency axiom (cf. Young (1987) or Thomson (2012) ) is related to population-monotonicity, but it is fundamentally different as in that case the leaving agents take their fair shares with them. Arzi et al. (2011) study the "dumping paradox" in cake-cutting. They show that, in some cakes, discarding a part of the cake improves the total social welfare of any envy-free division. This implies that enlarging the cake might decrease the total social welfare. This is related to resource-monotonicity; the difference is that in our case we are interested in the welfare of the individual agents and not in the total social welfare. Chambers (2005) studies a related cake-cutting axiom called "division independence": if the cake is divided into sub-plots and each sub-plot is divided according to a rule, then the outcome should be identical to dividing the original cake using the same rule. He proves that the only rule which satisfies Paretooptimality and division independence is the utilitarian-optimal rule -the rule which maximizes the sum of the agents' utilities. Unfortunately, this rule does not satisfy the fairness axioms of proportionality and envy-freeness. Walsh (2011) studies the problem of "online cake-cutting", in which agents arrive and depart during the process of dividing the cake. He shows how to adapt classic procedures like cut-and-choose and the Dubins-Spanier in order to satisfy online variants of the fairness axioms. Monotonicity properties are not studied, although the problem is similar in spirit to the concept of populationmonotonicity.
Model

Cake-cutting
A cake-cutting problem is a triple Γ(N, C, ( v i ) i∈N ) where:
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of agents who participate in the cakecutting process. In examples with a small number of agents, we often refer to them by names (Alice, Bob, Carl...).
• C is the cake. For simplicity we assume that C is a interval, C = [0, c] for some real number c.
• v i is the value measure of agent i. It is a finite real-valued function defined on the Borel subsets of [0, ∞).
We call a Borel subset of C a slice. A slice with zero Lebesgue-measure is referred to as a zero slice while a slice with positive Lebesgue-measure as a positive slice. A slice that is allotted to an agent is called a piece.
As the term "measure" implies, the value measures of all agents are countably additive: the value measures of a union of disjoint slices is the sum of the values of the slices. Moreover, we assume that the value measures are nonnegative and boundedv i assigns a finite non-negative number to each slice of C. We also assume that the value measures are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure: this means that a zero slice has zero value to anyone. In particular any point on the interval is worthless for the agents. Without loss of generality, we assume that every positive slice has a positive value to at least one agent, and every agent assigns a positive value to the entire cake. All these assumptions are standard in the cake-cutting literature.
Our model diverges from the standard cake-cutting setup in that we do not require the value measures to be normalized. That is, the value of the entire cake is not necessarily the same for all agents. This is important because we examine scenarios where the cake changes, so the cake value might become larger or smaller. Hence, we differentiate between absolute and relative value measures:
• The absolute value measure of the entire cake, v i (C), can be any positive value and it can be different for different agents.
• The relative value of the entire cake is 1 for all agents. Relative value measures are denoted by v i and defined by:
It is also common to assume that value measures are private information of the agents. This question leads us to whether agents are honest about their preferences. As we noted before cake-cutting problems can be studied from a strategic angle. Here, however, we will not analyze the strategic behavior of the agents.
The aim is to divide the cake into n pairwise-disjoint slices. A division rule is a correspondence that takes a cake-cutting problem as input and returns a division X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), or a set of divisions. Note that a division does not necessarily compose a partition of C (i.e. free disposal is assumed).
A
That is, even if R returns a set of divisions, all agents are indifferent between these divisions.
The classic requirements of fair cake-cutting are the following. A division X is called:
• Pareto-optimal (PO) if there is no other division which is weakly better for all agents and strictly better for at least one agent.
• Proportional (PROP) if each agent gets at least 1/n fraction of the cake according to his own evaluation, i.e. for all i ∈ N , v i (X i ) ≥ 1/n. Note that the definition uses relative values.
• Envy-free (EF) if each agent gets a piece which is weakly better, for that agent, than all other pieces: for all i, j ∈ N , v i (X i ) ≥ v i (X j ). Note that here it is irrelevant whether absolute or relative values are used. Note also that PO+EF imply PROP.
A division rule is called Pareto-optimal (PO) if it returns only PO divisions. The same applies to proportionality and envy-freeness.
Monotonicity
We now define the two monotonicity properties. In the introduction we defined them informally for the special case in which the division rule returns a single division. Our formal definition is more general and applicable to rules that may return a set of divisions. 
Note that -for practical reasons -we enlarge the cake from the right hand side but this fact does not have any significance from theoretical point of view (the theorems are valid no matter where the enlargement is placed).
i.e all agents are weakly better-off in the new division).
(b) A division rule R is called downwards resource-monotonic, if for all pairs (Γ , Γ), where Γ is a cake-enlargement of Γ, for every division Y ∈ R(Γ ) there exists a division X ∈ R(Γ) such that v i (X i ) ≤ v i (Y i ) for all i ∈ N (i.e all agents are weakly worse-off in the new division).
(c) A division rule is resource-monotonic (RM), if it is both upwards and downwards resource-monotonic.
Definition 3.3. Let C be a fixed cake, N and N two sets of agents such that N ⊃ N and ( v i ) i∈N their value measures. The cake-cutting problem
for all i ∈ N (all the original agents are weakly worse-off in the new division).
(b) A division rule R is called downwards population-monotonic, if for all pairs (Γ, Γ ) such that Γ is a population-reduction of Γ, for every division X ∈ R(Γ) there exists a division Y ∈ R(Γ ) such that v i (Y i ) ≥ v i (X i ) for all i ∈ N (all remaining agents are weakly better-off in the new division).
(c) A division rule is population-monotonic (PM), if it is both upwards and downwards population-monotonic. Remark 3.6. For essentially-single-valued solutions, downwards resource (or population) monotonicity implies upwards resource (or population) monotonicity and vice versa. Set-valued solutions, however, may satisfy only one direction of these axioms.
Remark 3.7. The monotonicity axioms in Thomson (2011) require that all divisions in R(Γ) should be weakly better/worse than all divisions in R(Γ ). In contrast, our definition only requires that there exists such a division. This is closer to the definition of aggregate monotonicity, which originates from cooperative game theory Peleg and Sudhölter (2007) . The rationale is that even if a set-valued solution is used, only a single allocation will be implemented. Hence, the divider can be faithful to the monotonicity principles even if the rule suggests many non-monotonic allocations as well.
Examples
All the examples in this paper feature piecewise homogeneous cakes. These are finite unions of disjoint intervals, such that on each interval the value densities of all agents are constant (although different agents may evaluate the same piece differently). In such cases, the function v i ([0, x]) -which displays the value (for Agent i) of the piece which lies left to the point x ∈ R -is a piecewise-linear function (see Figure 1 ). We stress that our theorems hold for arbitrary cakesnot only piecewise-homogeneous.
Piecewise homogeneous cakes can be represented by a simple table containing the value densities of the agents on the different slices. For example the cake in Figure 1 has the following representation. v A 2.5 0 2 2 0 0 v B 1 1 0 0 1 1 Throughout the paper the sign over a column indicates the enlargement. Let us illustrate resource-monotonicity on a basic example. The following cake shows that the most widely applied division method Cut and Choose is not resource monotonic (see Table 1) . While the extra piece is not present, Agent A (Alice) cuts the cake after the second slice, allowing Agent B (Bob) to choose the piece worth 5 for him. However if we enlarge the cake, Alice cuts after the third slice and no matter which piece Bob chooses, he loses utility. This simple counterexample implies that the Banach-Knaster, Dubins-Spanier, Even-Paz and the Fink methods are not resource-monotonic either, as they all produce the same division on the above cake as the Cut and Choose 4 . Further examples can be found in .
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (CEEI) is known to be a fair allocation rule for homogeneous resource allocation (Varian, 1974) . It was first introduced into the cake-cutting world by Weller (1985) .
Definition 4.1 (Weller (1985) ). Let C be a cake and X an allocation of the cake. Let P be a continuous measure on C (called the "price measure") such that P (Z) = 0 when Z is a zero-slice and P (Z) > 0 when Z is a positive-slice. We say that the pair (P, X) is a CEEI if it satisfies the following conditions:
• CE: For every agent i, every positive-slice Z i ⊆ X i and every positive-slice
• EI: For every agent i: P (X i ) = 1.
CE is Competitive Equilibrium; it says that every agent receives only slices on which his value/price ratio is maximal. EI is Equal Incomes; it says that every agent receives a piece with the same total price. Notice that it does not matter whether absolute or relative values are used in this definition, since only values of the same agent are compared.
Example 4.2. Consider the following cake. v A 2 2 2 2 2 2 v B 1 1 4 4 1 1 A CEEI allocation gives the two central slices to Bob and the four peripheral slices to Alice. The price of a central slice is 1/2 and the price of a peripheral slice is 1/4. Theorem 4.3 (Weller (1985) ). (a) A CEEI cake-allocation always exists. (b) A CEEI cake-allocation is Pareto-optimal and envy-free.
We are now going to prove that the CEEI rule -the rule which returns all CEEI allocations -is both essentially-single-valued and monotonic.
Let (P, X) be a CEEI on the cake C and (Q, Y ) a CEEI on an enlarged cake C ∪ E. By definition of CEEI, the price measures P and Q are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Thus, they have Radon-Nikodym derivatives with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Call them p, q, such that for every slice Z ⊆ C:
Define the following subset of the original cake C, which contains all those parts of C which are more expensive in equilibrium Y than in equilibrium X:
For every positive-slice Z * ⊆ C * : Q(Z * ) > P (Z * ). By definition, for every
Lemma 4.4. If in equilibrium Y agent i holds a positive subset of C * (i.e. Y i ∩ C * has positive Lebesgue measure), then in equilibrium X agent i holds almost only subsets of C * (X i ∩ C * = X i almost surely).
the definition of C * implies that the old price of Z * i was lower than the new price and the old price of Z was weakly higher than the new price. Hence,
This is true for every Z which is a positive slice of C \C * ; hence, X i ∩(C \C * ) has Lebesgue measure 0.
The following lemma will be used both for essentially-single-valuedness and monotonicity. It says that, when the cake grows, the equilibrium price of the old cake does not increase.
Lemma 4.5. Let (P, X) be a CEEI on the cake C and (Q, Y ) a CEEI on an enlarged cake C ∪ E. Then, for every subset of the original cake Z ⊆ C:
Proof. Suppose there are exactly k agents that hold a positive subset of C * in equilibrium Y . Their total income is k and they can afford all of C * , so:
On the other hand, by Lemma 4.4, in Equilibrium X these k agents spend their entire income on C * , so:
Combining these two inequalities gives:
But, for every positive-slice Z * ⊆ C * , Q(Z * ) > P (Z * ). We conclude that C * is a zero-slice (its Lebesgue measure is 0). Hence, q(x) ≤ p(x) almost everywhere, which implies our Lemma.
Corollary 4.6. Let (P, X) and (Q, Y ) be two CEEIs on the same cake C. Then Q ≡ P .
Proof. Apply Lemma 4.5 twice with E = ∅: once to prove that Q(Z) ≤ P (Z) and another time to prove that Q(Z) ≥ P (Z) for all Z ⊆ C.
Corollary 4.7. The CEEI division rule is essentially-single-valued.
Proof. By Corollary 4.6, every CEEI on the same cake has the same pricemeasure P . Hence, every CEEI has the same budget set (the subsets Z ⊆ C for which P (Z) = 1 are the same in every CEEI). In every CE, all agents attain the maximum utility in their budget sets, which is the same in all CEEIs.
Remark 4.8. Gale (1976) proved that, in any exchange economy with a finite number of goods and linear utilities, the CEEI rule is essentially-single-valued. Gale's result can be seen as a special case of our Corollary 4.7, since Gale's economy is equivalent to cake-cutting when the cake is piecewise-homogeneous (each homogeneous region in such a cake represents a commodity in Gale's economy).
Corollary 4.9. The CEEI division rule is resource-monotonic.
Proof. Suppose a cake C is enlarged, let C ∪ E be the enlarged cake and let (P, X), (Q, Y ) be the equilibria on C and C ∪ E, respectively. By Lemma 4.5, the prices on the original cake C in the new price system (Q) are weakly lower than in the old price system (P ). Hence, the budget set under Q contains the budget set under P . Hence, in the new equilibrium Y , all agents can afford the pieces that they had in equilibrium X. In every CE, all agents attain the maximum utility in their budget sets, which is weakly larger in Y than in X.
Corollary 4.10. The CEEI division rule is population-monotonic.
Proof. Let(P, X) be a CEEI allocation. Suppose an agent i leaves and abandons his share X i . The pair (P, X) still satisfies the CE and EI conditions on the cake C \ X i , so it is still a CEEI allocation. Now, apply the resource-monotonicity (Corollary 4.9) with E = X i .
In conclusion:
Theorem 4.11. The CEEI cake-cutting rule is EF+PROP+PO+RM+PM.
Remark 4.12. The CEEI rule was one of the first examples of a division rule which is not resource-monotonic (Aumann and Peleg, 1974) and not populationmonotonic (Chichilnisky and Thomson, 1987) . However, as noted later by Moulin and Thomson (1988) , the examples use complementary products, while the standard cake-cutting model (without connectivity) assumes no complementaries between different parts of the cake.
Welfare-Maximizing Rules
Encouraged by the positive results of the previous section, we would like to check if there are other rules with similar fairness properties. Since we are looking for Pareto-optimal division rules, it makes sense to search in the family of welfare maximizing rules. A welfare-maximizing rule is characterized by a strictly increasing function w : R + → R. We limit our attention to welfare functions which are differentiable. This is a weak restriction because, by the Lebesgue differentiation theorem, a strictly-increasing function is differentiable almost everywhere. Given a function w, it is possible to define two different social welfare maximizers:
• The absolute-w-maximizer rule selects allocations that maximize
Such social-welfare functions are characterized by several reasonable axioms: completeness, transitivity, symmetry, continuity, and independence of unconcerned agents (Moulin, 2004, pages 66-69) .
By the Dubins-Spanier theorems (Dubins and Spanier, 1961) , the set of cake-allocations is compact, so all welfare-maximizing rules are well-defined. Moreover, they are trivially Pareto-optimal. Some rules of this family have special names:
• When w is the identity function w(v) = v, the welfare-maximizers correspond to the utilitarian allocation rules, maximizing the sum of values. There are two different utilitarian rules, depending on whether absolute or relative values are used:
• When w is a logarithmic function such as w(v) = ln v, the absolute-wmaximizer and relative-w-maximizer rules are the same rule -the rule that maximizes the product of utilities, the Nash-optimal rule:
This rule first appeared in the solution to the Nash bargaining problem (Nash, 1950) . Note that when maximizing the product, it is irrelevant whether absolute or relative values are used.
• Although the leximin rules (see Section 7 for a definition) cannot be represented by a numeric welfare function, it can be shown that these rules are the limit of a sequence of welfare-maximizing rules. For every p < 0, let w p (x) = −x p . Then, the limit when p → −∞ of the absolute-w pmaximizers is the absolute-leximin rule and the limit of the relative-w pmaximizers is the relative-leximin rule (Moulin, 2004, chapter 3) .
As we will see in this section, the properties of welfare-maximizing rules crucially depend on the level of concavity of the function w. Specifically, we will be interested in whether w is convex (w (x) is increasing) or concave (w (x) is decreasing). Additionally, we are interested in the following sub-class of the strictly concave functions:
Note that for strictly increasing functions hyper concavity implies strictconcavity, but the opposite is not true 5 . In the following subsections we will examine the properties of rules from the two welfare-maximizer families. We prove that:
• When w is hyper-concave, relative-w-maximizer rules are proportional;
• When w is concave, absolute-w-maximizer rules are resource-monotonic.
The link between concavity and proportionality is not surprising. Intuitively, if w is strictly concave, then giving an additional unit of utility to an agent produces less and less social welfare as the agent's utility increases. For instance if we divide a cake among two agents, and there is a small slice that worth approximately the same for the two agents, then a strictly concave w-maximizer will give that slice to the 'poorer' agent, while a strictly convex w-maximizer will give it to the 'richer' agent.
The link between concavity and resource-monotonicity seems more surprising at first, but the key is the same as in the case of proportionality. The proof of Theorem 5.5 provides some intuition about this relationship.
Essentially-single-valuedness
We start our analysis with a sufficient and necessary condition that guarantees that a welfare-maximizing rule is essentially-single-valued.
Lemma 5.2. If the function w is strictly concave, then the absolute-w-maximizer and relative-w-maximizer rules are essentially-single-valued.
Proof. If w is strictly concave, then the welfare functions W w and W w are also strictly concave. By the Dubins-Spanier theorems (1961) , the space of utilities of cake-allocations is compact and convex. It is known that, in a compact and convex set, a strictly concave function has exactly one maximum.
For absolute-welfare-maximizers, strict-concavity is also necessary for ESV:
Lemma 5.3. If there is an interval in which w is convex (w is weakly increasing), then the relative-w-maximizer rule is not essentially-single-valued.
Proof. W.l.o.g., assume that the interval in which w is convex contains [s, t], where 0 < s < t < 1. Consider the following cake:
By Pareto-optimality, slice #1 goes to Alice and slice #2 goes to Bob. Let x be the fraction of slice #3 that goes to Alice, so that Alice's value is s(1 − x) + tx and Bob's value is sx + t(1 − x). The social welfare as a function of x is:
Since w is convex on [s, t], F (x) is also convex, so the maximum is attained either at x = 0 or at x = 1. But F (0) = F (1) = w(s) + w(t), so both must be maximum points. But, in these two maximum points, Alice and Bob receive different values (Alice receives more when x = 1 and Bob receives more when x = 0). Thus absolute-w-maximizer is not essentially-single-valued.
For relative-welfare-maximizers, strict-concavity is necessary when ESV is combined with proportionality:
Lemma 5.4. If there is a sub-interval of [0, 1] in which w is convex (w is weakly increasing), and the relative-w-maximizer rule is proportional, then it is not essentially-single-valued.
Proof. W.l.o.g., assume that the interval in which w is convex contains [s, t], where 0 < s < t < 1. Consider the following cake, which has to be divided among k + 2 agents -Alice, Bob and the so called complementary agents
By proportionality, each of the complementary agents receive at least 1/(k + 2) fraction of slice #4. Thus from slice #4 Alice and Bob can obtain at most:
utility. Thus, from slices #3 and #4 together, Alice and Bob can obtain at most t − s − ε utility, for some ε > 0. Fix a division of slice #4 among the complementary agents. Let W C := k i=1 w(v Ci (X Ci )) = the contribution of the complementary agents to the total welfare. Let x ∈ [0, 1] signify how Alice and Bob share slice #3 and the remnants of slice #4 -the slices they both find valuable. Then, the social welfare as a function of x is:
Since w is convex on [s, t], F (x) is also convex, so the maximum is attained either at x = 0 or at x = 1. But F (0) = F (1), so both must be maximum points, implying that relative-w-maximizer is not ESV.
Resource-monotonicity
The next theorem states that for absolute w-maximizers, weak concavity of w is a necessary and sufficient condition for RM.
Theorem 5.5. W w is resource monotonic if and only if w is concave.
Proof. Only if part: we prove that whenever there is an interval in which w is strictly convex, the absolute-w-maximizer rule is not RM. W.l.o.g., assume that the interval in which w is strictly convex contains [s, s + 2t], for some s ≥ 0 and t > 0. Then, by convexity
The continuity of w implies that there exists a small > 0 such that:
Consider the following cake:
Initially the cake is made of only the three leftmost slices. By PO, Alice gets the first slice and Bob gets the second slice. For any x ∈ [0, 1] let Y (x) be the allocation where Alice gets the first slice and x fraction of the third slice. So Alice's absolute value is s + x · (t + ) and Bob's absolute value is s + (1 − x) · (t).
The absolute welfare, as a function of x, is:
When x ∈ [0, 1], the arguments to w in the above expression are all in the range [s, s + 2t] in which w is strictly convex. Hence, F (x) is strictly convex in the interval [0, 1] so its maximum must be in one of the endpoints: F (0) = w(s) + w(s + t) or F (1) = w(s + t + ) + w(s). Since w is increasing and s + t + > s + t, the maximum is attained at x = 1, so Alice gets all the slice and her value is s + t + . When the cake grows, PO dictates that the rightmost slice is given to Bob. Again, for any x ∈ [0, 1] let Y (x) denote the allocation where Alice gets the first slice and x fraction of the third slice. Now the absolute welfare is:
the maximum in the range [0, 1] is either G(0) = w(s) + w(s + 2t) or G(1) = w(s + t + ) + w(s + t). Inequality (1) implies that the former is larger so the maximum is at x = 0, Alice gets nothing from the third slice and her value drops to s. This proves that absolute-w-maximizer is not RM.
If part: we assume that w is concave and prove that absolute-w-maximizer is resource-monotonic.
Let X be an allocation that maximizes the welfare function W w on the original cake C, and Y an allocation that maximizes W w on an enlarged cake C ∪ E. We call a pair of agents, (i, j), a bad pair, if:
• Agent i has conceded a positive slice to agent j, i.e, X i ∩ Y j is positive.
If there are no unlucky agents in Y , then we are done. Moreover, if there are no bad pairs in Y , then by giving all unlucky and indifferent agents the original share that they had in X, the unlucky agents will be better-off and the other agents will not be harmed. Hence, if Y is welfare-maximizing and has no bad pairs, then Y has no unlucky agents at all, and we are done.
Therefore, to prove upwards-RM, it is sufficient to prove that there exists a division Y of C ∪ E with W w (Y ) = W w (Y ) where there are no bad pairs. Let (i, j) be a bad pair and let H := X i ∩ Y j . By definition H is positive, so by PO it has a positive value for both i and j. Let z ∈ [0, 1] be a number defined as:
A theorem of Stromquist and Woodall (1985) implies that there exists a subset H z ⊆ H such that:
both hold. That is, i does not become lucky by getting H z and j does not become unlucky by losing H z (but one of them may become indifferent). The concavity of w, together with the inequalities (2) and (3), imply the following two inequalities:
By the optimality of X:
Combining 6, 5 and 4 together yields
So if we modify division Y by transferring H z from j back to i, the welfare weakly increases. Moreover, after the transfer, the pair (i, j) is no longer a bad pair (either one of the agents becomes indifferent, or the conceded slice becomes empty). Moreover, no new bad pairs are created by the transfer, since no agents became lucky/unlucky. Therefore, we can remove the bad pairs one by one, until we get a new division Y , which has the same welfare of Y but no bad pairs. This implies that the absolute w-maximizer is upwards-RM. For downwards-RM the proof is similar: again, X is the old division (of the larger cake) and Y is the new division (of the smaller cake). define a bad pair as a pair (i, j) such that:
• Agent i has taken a positive slice from agent i, i.e, Y i ∩ X j is positive.
If there are no lucky agents in Y , then we are done. Moreover, if there are no bad pairs in Y , then the original division X could be modified by giving all lucky and indifferent agents the share they are going to receive in Y (since the cake in division X contains the cake of division Y). This makes the lucky agents better-off and does not harm the unlucky agents. Hence, if X is welfaremaximizing and there are no bad pairs in Y , then Y has no lucky agents at all, and we are done. From here, the proof that there exists a division Y where there are no bad pairs follows the above proof word by word.
Remark 5.6. Theorem 5.5 immediately implies that the absolute-utilitarian and the Nash-optimal rules are resource-monotonic. What about the absoluteleximin rule? As explained above, the absolute-leximin rule cannot be represented by a welfare function, but it can be obtained as the limit of concave welfare functions. Therefore, it "should" behave like a concave rule and be RM. It is indeed RM; we prove this formally in Section 7.
Population-monotonicity
Lemma 5.7. If w is concave then W w and W w are both population-monotonic.
Proof. When checking population-monotonicity, the total cake value does not change, so the proof for absolute-w-maximizer and relative-w-maximizer is the same.
Downwards-PM follows from upwards-RM: the piece abandoned by an agent who leaves the scene can be regarded as an enlargement of the cake available to the other agents.
Upwards-PM does not follow directly from downwards-RM. However, we can prove upwards-PM by copying the proof of downwards-RM (see the end of Theorem 5.5). The only difference is that here X should be defined as the original division and Y as the new division after another agent have joined the division process.
Proportionality
In this subsection we derive sufficient conditions for the proportionality of welfare-maximizers. These conditions are based on several generic lemmas that describe the properties of welfare-maximizing allocations.
The following lemma is stated and proved for relative welfare and relative values, but is also true for absolute welfare and absolute values, with analogous proofs.
Lemma 5.8. Let X be an allocation that maximizes the relative social-welfare function W w . For every two agents i, j and for every positive slice H ⊆ X j :
(intuitively, each fraction of cake is given to an agent j for whom the product w · v j is maximal).
Proof. Again we will use the theorem of Stromquist and Woodall (1985) . For every H and z ∈ [0, 1], there exists a subset H z ⊆ H such that:
Let Y (z) be an allocation derived from X by taking H z from agent j and giving it to agent i. The difference of welfare between the two allocations, as a function of z, is:
Take the derivative as a function of z:
When z = 0, the alternative allocation Y (z) is identical to the original allocation X, and we know that this allocation maximizes W w , so 0 is a maximum point of F . Therefore, F (0) ≤ 0:
Given an allocation X, we say that:
• An agent i envies agent j, if v i (X i ) < v i (X j ). Note that it does not matter whether absolute or relative values are used, since the comparison is between valuations of the same agent.
• An agent i is relatively/absolutely richer than agent j,
. Note that here it does matter whether absolute or relative values are used, since the comparison is between valuations of different agents.
• An agent i is relatively/absolutely poorer than agent j,
The following lemma says that, with a hyper-concave welfare-maximizer, a poor agent never envies a richer agent. It is stated and proved for relative values, but it is also true for absolute values with an analogous proof.
Lemma 5.9. Let w be a hyper-concave function (xw (x) is a weakly decreasing function of x). If, in an allocation selected by the relative-w-maximizer rule, an agent i envies an agent j, then agent i is relatively-richer than agent j.
Proof. By Lemma 5.8 (taking H = X j ):
Combining the latter inequality with the assumption that i envies j
The previous lemma also holds when X is selected by the absolute-w-maximizer rule, and "relatively-richer" is replaced by "absolutely-richer". The proof is entirely analogous. The next lemma is true only for relative values.
Theorem 5.10. If the function w is hyper-concave (xw (x) is weakly decreasing), then the relative-w-maximizer rule is proportional.
Proof. Let X be an allocation selected by relative-w-maximizer. Call an agent "unhappy" if v i (X i ) < 1/n. Proving PROP is equivalent to proving that there are no unhappy agents. Suppose by contradiction that agent i is unhappy. By the pigeonhole principle, he necessarily envies some other agent, say j. By Lemma 5.9, agent j must be relatively-poorer than i, so j is also unhappy. Now, consider the set of all unhappy agents. Since each agent in the set envies another agent in the set, there must be a cycle of agents envying each other. But this contradicts the optimality of X. Hence, the set of unhappy agents must be empty.
Remark 5.11. Strict concavity is not sufficient for proportionality. For example, for some constant p ∈ (0, 1), Let w p (x) = x p . Note that w p is strictly concave but not hyper-concave. Consider the following cake:
Let x ∈ [0, 1] be the value given to Alice. The value remaining for Bob is 1 − 2x/3. By proportionality, Bob must receive at least 1/2, so a proportional rule must select x ≤ 3/4. The total relative (and absolute) welfare, as a function of x, is given by:
. This means that F cannot have a maximum point at x ≤ 3/4, so the relative-w-maximizer rule is not proportional.
The Nash-optimal rule
Let us collect our findings so far.
• When w is concave, the absolute-w-maximizer is RM.
• When w is strictly concave, both the absolute-w-maximizer and the relativew-maximizer are ESV and PM.
• When w is hyper-concave, the relative-w-maximizer is PROP.
Hyper-concavity implies (strict) concavity. Hence, hyper-concave welfare-maximizers have many good properties. If we can find a rule that is simultaneously maximizing the absolute and relative social welfare with the same hyper-concave function w, then this rule will have all the desirable properties. Indeed, such a rule exists. When w is a logarithmic function, absolute-w-maximizer and relative-w-maximizer are both equivalent to the Nash-optimal rule.
Corollary 5.12. The Nash-optimal rule is ESV, RM, PM and PROP.
Is Nash-optimal the only welfare-maximizing rule with these four properties? Below we prove that it is indeed unique. We first prove its uniqueness in the family of absolute-welfare-maximizers.
Lemma 5.13. If the absolute-w-maximizer is proportional, then it must be the Nash-optimal rule. Proof. Consider the following one-slice cake:
A proportional allocation must give each agent exactly half the cake, so that
Using Lemma 5.8 with j =Alice and H = X A and i =Bob gives:
Using Lemma 5.8 with j =Bob and H = X B and i =Alice gives:
Since a, b are general, this implies that:
This means that the function aw (a) is a constant function (independent of a).
Hence, w must be a logarithmic function (w(·) = c ln (·) + d, for some constants c > 0 and d) so absolute-w-maximizer is the Nash-optimal rule.
We now turn to proving the uniqueness of the Nash-optimal rule in the family of relative welfare-maximizers. By Lemma 5.4, a relative-w-maximizer is ESV only if w is strictly concave. Since we are interested in ESV rules, we assume from now on that w is strictly concave.
Lemma 5.14. If w is strictly concave in [0, 1] and the relative-w-maximizer rule is proportional and resource-monotonic, then it is the Nash-optimal rule. Proof sketch. We show a cake that has to be divided among k + 2 agents -Alice, Bob and the so called complementary agents C 1 , . . . , C k . We assume that k is large. One slice of the cake -the 'disputed slice' -is wanted only by Alice and Bob, and the main task of the relative-w-maximizer rule is to decide how this slice is divided between them.
In the initial situation, the cake is small, and both Alice and Bob value the entire cake as 1. Their value measures are similar, so a strictly concave rule must give each of them exactly 1/2 of the disputed slice. Then the cake grows. The enlargement is valuable only for Bob and for the complementary agents, but not for Alice. When k is sufficiently large, the complementary agents take all the enlargement, so Bob gains no value from it; the only effect of the enlargement is that Bob's value for the entire cake is larger, so Bob's relative value for the disputed slice is smaller. This breaks the symmetry and causes the relative-w-maximizer rule to give either Alice or Bob a smaller share of the disputed slice -in contradiction to resource-monotonicity. The only case in which this does not happen is when w is a logarithmic function, which implies that relative-w-maximizer is the Nash-optimal rule.
All the above has to be done twice: once to prove that w(x) is logarithmic when x ∈ [0, 1/2], and then to prove that it is logarithmic when x ∈ [1/2, 1].
Proof. In the following cakes, the valuations are parameterized by s and t.
Cake 1 has the following valuations, for 0 < s < t < 1 and t ≥ 1/2:
Initially the cake contains only the four leftmost slices. Alice gets slice #2 and Bob gets slice #3. By strict concavity, slice #1 is divided equally between Alice and Bob, and their value (relative and absolute alike) is t.
When the cake grows, the cake value increases from 1 to t/s for Bob and for the complementary agents. Let Y be the new allocation. The relative value of Bob is now at least (2t − 1)/(t/s). In contrast, the complementary agents have to share a relative value of 1, so there is at least one agent for whom:
We claim that, for such k, Bob does not receive any value from the enlargement. Indeed, suppose by contradiction that Bob receives a positive slice from the enlargement. Then by Lemma 5.8, for any H ⊆ Y B :
When H is a subset of the enlargement, v B (H) = v Ci (H), so the above implies:
But this combined with (7) contradicts the strict concavity of w.
Since -for sufficiently large k -Bob does not receive anything from the enlargement, by resource-monotonicity he must receive at least half of slice #1. The same is true for Alice, so both of them must receive exactly half of slice #1. This gives them a total absolute value of t. Thus,
Apply Lemma 5.8 with j =Alice, i =Bob and H =Alice's share of slice #1:
Apply Lemma 5.8 with j =Bob, i =Alice and H =Bob's share of slice #1:
Combine these two inequalities to obtain tw (t) = sw (s), for any t ≥ 1/2. Formally, ∀t ≥ 1/2 : ∀s with 0 < s < t < 1 : tw (t) = sw (s)
Cake 2 has the following valuations, for 0 < s < t < 1 and t ≤ 1/2:
Initially the cake contains only the four leftmost slices. By strict concavity Alice and Bob divide the slices valuable to both of them equally, so each of them receives at least t. When the cake grows, Bob's total cake value as well as the second k-set of complementary agent's cake value increases from 1 to t/s. By the same reasoning as in case of Cake 1, Bob does not receive anything from the enlargement, and neither Alice nor Bob receive anything from slice #3. By resource-monotonicity, Alice and Bob should have an absolute value of at least t, so they must split slice #1 equally, giving each of them an absolute value of exactly t. Hence, v A (Y A ) = t and v B (Y B ) = t/(t/s) = s. From here, the proof is the same as in the previous case, and we get: ∀t ≤ 1/2 : ∀s with 0 < s < t < 1 : tw (t) = sw (s)
The equations (8) and (9) together imply that the function tw (t) must be the constant function for all t ∈ (0, 1). This implies that w is a logarithmic function, hence the relative-w-maximizer is the Nash-optimal rule. Summarizing the last two lemmata,
• The only absolute-w-maximizer rule which is PROP is the Nash-optimal rule.
• The only relative-w-maximizer rule which is ESV, PROP and RM is the Nash-optimal rule.
Corollary 5.15. In the family of welfare-maximizers, the Nash-optimal rule is the only essentially single-valued rule that is both PROP and RM.
The equivalence of the CEEI and the Nash-Optimal rules
We saw two allocation-rules that are ESV+PROP+RM+PM: the CEEI rule (Section 4) and the Nash-optimal rule (Section 5). In this section we prove that these are actually the same rule. Lemma 6.1. Let X be a Nash-optimal division. Then, there exists a price measure P such that (P, X) is CEEI.
Proof. Define P as defined by Weller (1985) :
Since proportional allocations exist, the maximum Nash welfare is necessarily positive. Hence, all agents have a strictly positive value in X, so P is welldefined. The value of P on other subsets of C, that are not contained in any X i exclusively, can be easily calculated based on the additivity of P . We first show that P satisfies the requirements from a price-measure (Definition 4.1). By the continuity of the measures v i , the measure P is also continuous and the price of zero-slices is 0. Moreover, since X is Nash-optimal, X is Paretooptimal. Hence, v i (Z i ) is positive when Z i is a positive-slice and the same is true for P (Z i ).
Clearly the pair (P, X) satisfies the EI condition, since by definition of P :
Now we show that the pair (P, X) satisfies the CE condition. This is equivalent to showing that for every agent i, every positive slice Z i ⊆ X i and every positive slice Z ⊆ C:
By definition of P , The right-hand side equals 1/v i (X i ), so the CE condition is equivalent to:
The subset Z can be written as a disjoint union of n subsets: Z = ∪ n j=1 Z j , such that for every j, Z j = Z ∩ X j . By Lemma 5.8, for every j:
where the function w is a logarithmic function, e,g, w(x) = ln(x). Therefore, w (x) = 1/x and we get:
Summing the latter inequality for j = 1, . . . , n gives:
By the additivity of P and v i , this implies 10.
Remark 6.2. The compactness theorem of Dubins and Spanier (1961) implies that Nash-optimal allocations exist. Lemma 6.1 implies that these are CEEI allocations. This implies that CEEI allocations exist. This provides an alternative proof for the existence of CEEI allocations, which is apparently shorter than the original proof of Weller (1985) .
The converse of Lemma 6.1 is also true:
Lemma 6.3. If (P, X) is CEEI, then the allocation X is Nash-optimal.
Proof. Let Y be a Nash-optimal allocation. By Lemma 6.1, there exists Q such that (Q, Y ) is CEEI. By Corollary 4.7, the CEEI rule is essentially-single-valued, so all agents have in X exactly the same values that they have in Y . Therefore, X is also Nash-optimal.
Remark 6.4. Equivalence between Nash-optimal and CEEI divisions exists in other division problems in which the utility functions are homogeneous, e.g. Eisenberg and Gale (1959) . The proofs in this section show that this equivalence exists in the cake-cutting problem, too.
The Leximin-optimal rules
Lexicographic optimization as a solution concept is used in various fields of fair division (Moulin, 2004) . Dubins and Spanier (1961) were the first to employ it in a cake-cutting setting. Later, Dall'Aglio (2001); Dall'Aglio and Hill (2003) ; Dall'Aglio and Di Luca (2012) presented various properties and approximation algorithms for finding such leximin divisions (they call such divisions Dubins-Spanier-optimal ).
The leximin idea is simple: First we narrow down the solution set to divisions that maximize the utility of the poorest agent. Then among those solutions that satisfy this criterion, we select those which maximize the utility of the second poorest agent. We repeat this process with the third, fourth, etc. poorest agent. To introduce this concept formally first we define lexicographical ordering of real vectors.
We say that vector y ∈ R n is lexicographically greater than x ∈ R n (denoted by x ≺ y) if x = y and there exists a number 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that x i = y i if i < j and x j < y j .
Definition 7.1. (a) For a cake division X, define the relative-leximin-welfare vector as a vector of length n which contains the relative values of the agents under division X in a non-decreasing order.
(b) A cake division Y is said to be relative-leximin-better than X if the relative-leximin-welfare vector of Y is lexicographically greater than the relativeleximin-welfare vector of X.
(c) A cake division X is called relative-leximin-optimal if no other division is relative-leximin-better than X.
(d) The relative-leximin division rule is the rule that returns all relativeleximin-optimal divisions of the cake.
The terms absolute-leximin-welfare vector, absolute-leximin-better and absoluteleximin-optimal and the absolute-leximin division rule are defined analogously.
Example 7.2. In the following cake, the absolute-leximin division rule splits the leftmost slice between Alice and Bob, giving each of them 6. The rightmost slice is given to Carl. Thus, the absolute-leximin-optimal vector is (6, 6, 9) . The v A 12 0 v B 12 0 v C 21 9 relative value vector of the above division is (6/12, 6/12, 9/30) . The corresponding relative-leximin welfare vector is (9/30, 6/12, 6/12) = (3/10, 1/2, 1/2), which is not optimal. The relative-leximin rule divides the leftmost slice between all three agents, giving 1/6 to Carl (absolute value 3.5) and 5/12 to Alice and Bob (absolute value 5). The rightmost slice is given to Carl. The relative-leximinoptimal vector is (5/12, 5/12, 5/12). Dubins and Spanier (1961) use the compactness of the space of value-matrices to prove that leximin-optimal cake divisions always exist. The proof is equally valid for absolute and relative leximin-optimal divisions. Hence, both the absoluteand the relative-leximin division rules are well-defined. Moreover, these rules are both Pareto-optimal since by definition, if a division Y Pareto-dominates a division X, then both the absolute and the relative leximin-welfare vectors of Y are larger than those of X.
In Lemma 5.9 we proved that, in a hyper-concave welfare-maximizing allocation, an poorer agent never envies a richer agent. In a leximin allocation, a stronger lemma is true: Lemma 7.3. For every absolute/relative-leximin-optimal division X, if agent j is absolutely/relatively poorer than agent i then agent j believes that the piece of agent i is worthless: v j (X i ) = v j (X i ) = 0.
Proof. If this were not the case, then we could take a small bit of X i and give it to agent j, thus achieving an absolute/relative-leximin-better division. But this contradicts the leximin-optimality of X.
In Example 7.2, in case of the absolute-leximin-optimal division, Carl is absolutely-richer than Alice and Bob, and indeed his share is worthless for both of them.
Suppose X is an old division and Y is a new division of the same cake. We say that an agent i conceded a slice to agent j if there is a positive slice that belonged to agent i in X and belongs to agent j in Y (in other words, X i ∩Y j has a positive Lebesgue-measure). If X and Y are both absolute/relative-leximinoptimal, then by Pareto-optimality, X i ∩ Y j has positive value to both the agent who concedes the slice (i) and the recipient (j). Hence, we have the following corollary of Lemma 7.3, which is true both for relative-and absolute-values:
Corollary 7.4. Let X and Y be two leximin-optimal divisions. If, when switching from X to Y , agent i conceded a slice to agent j, then in division X, agent i is weakly-poorer than j, and in division Y , agent i is weakly-richer than j.
Lemma 7.5. The absolute and the relative leximin division rules are essentially single-valued.
Proof. The proof is the same for the absolute and the relative leximin rules, so the adjectives are omitted.
Let X and Y are two different leximin-optimal divisions. We will prove that, when switching from X to Y , there are no "lucky" agents (agents who gain value) nor "unlucky" agents (agents who lose value).
Suppose by contradiction that agent i is unlucky. Then, he must have conceded a slice to at least one other agent, say j. By Corollary 7.4, i is weaklypoorer than j in X and weakly-richer in Y . But this means that j is also unlucky. So, all slices conceded by unlucky agents are held by other unlucky agents. Suppose the unlucky agents take back all the slices that they conceded. This has no effect on the lucky agents, but strictly increases the value of the unlucky agents, since they now have at least the value that they had in X. But this contradicts the optimality of Y . Hence, there are no unlucky agents. If Y had a lucky agent without having any unlucky agent that would contradict the optimality of X.
Since X and Y were arbitrary leximin-optimal divisions it follows that all leximin-optimal divisions have the same value vector.
Lemma 7.6. The absolute-and relative-leximin division rules are populationmonotonic.
Proof. Again the proof is the same for the absolute and the relative leximin rules. Thanks to Lemma 7.5 it is sufficient to prove downwards-PM.
Let X be a leximin-optimal division of C. Suppose that agent i leaves and abandons his share X i . So X is now a division of C \ X i among the agents N \ {i}. If X i is divided arbitrarily among N \ {i}, the result is X + , a division of C which is weakly leximin-better than X. Let Y be a leximin-optimal division of C among N \ {i}. Y is weakly leximin-better than X + and hence weakly leximin-better than X.
We are now going to prove that there are no unlucky agents in Y . Suppose by contradiction that agent i is unlucky. Then he must have conceded a slice to an agent j, who must also be unlucky (as explained in Lemma 7.5). All slices conceded by unlucky agents, are held by other unlucky agents. If those took back all the slices that they conceded, then all of them would be strictly better off while the lucky ones would remain unaffected. This contradicts the optimality of Y . Hence there are no unlucky agents and PM is proved.
The following lemma can be found in Dall'Aglio and Hill (2003) . For completeness, we supply an alternative proof.
Lemma 7.7. The absolute-and relative-leximin division rules are not envy-free.
Proof. Alice, Bob and three complementary agents share the following cake (see Table 2 ). Since every agent values the whole cake as 1, the absolute and relative v A 2/5 3/5 Alice envies Bob's piece, therefore the leximin rules are not envy free.
All our lemmata so far were true for both absolute-leximin and relativeleximin rules. The following subsections uncover the differences between these two rules.
7.1. Absolute-leximin rule: PM and RM but not PROP Theorem 7.8. The absolute-leximin division rule is population-monotonic and resource-monotonic.
Proof. PM was proved in Lemma 7.6. The proof of RM is essentially the same: the enlargement can be treated as a piece that was acquired from an agent who left the scene. 6
Unfortunately, the absolute-leximin rule is not PROP. For instance, in Example 7.2, the absolute-leximin-optimal division gives Carl a value of 9, which is only 3 10 of his total cake value. Hence it is also not envy-free.
7.2. PM and PROP but not RM Theorem 7.9. The relative-leximin division rule is proportional and populationmonotonic.
Proof. PM was proved in Lemma 7.6. PROP holds because proportional divisions exist. The relative-leximin-welfare of a proportional division is at least (1/n, . . . , 1/n), hence the optimal relative-leximin-welfare vector must be at least (1/n, . . . , 1/n).
Example 7.10. The following cake shows that the relative-leximin rule is not RM.
v A 9 9 0 0 0 0 v B 9 9 0 0 0 0 v C 4 4 10 0 0 18 v D 4 4 0 10 0 18 v E 4 4 0 0 10 18
The largest value that can be given to both Alice and Bob is 9. Hence, in the smaller cake, the optimal relative-leximin-welfare vector is (9/18, 9/18, 10/18, 10/18, 10/18) .
It is attained by halving the two leftmost slices between Alice and Bob, and giving the three slices at their right to Carl, David and Eve, in that order.
In the larger cake, the largest value that can be given to Carl, David and Eve from the additional slice at the right is 6. So the largest value that can be given to them from the four rightmost slices is 16. However, the total cake value has doubled for them. Hence, if Alice and Bob keep their share of 9, the relative-leximin-welfare vector changes to (16/36, 16/36, 16/36, 9/18, 9/18) .
Note that Alice and Bob are now relatively-richer than Carl, David and Eve, and their pieces have a positive value for them. Thus, by Lemma 7.3, the division in which Alice and Bob keep their current shares cannot be relativeleximin-optimal.
Remark 7.11. The equitable and leximin rules are closely related to the egalitarian-equivalent solution of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) . It is known that this rule is population-monotonic in other division problems (e.g. Moulin (2004) , chapter 7). Above we extended this result to cake-cutting.
that the relative-leximin-optimal division of the enlarged cake is lexicographically smaller than the relative-leximin-optimal division of the smaller cake, since the change in the total cake values changes the order between the agents' relative values.
Conclusion and Future Work
We studied monotonicity properties in combination with classic fairness axioms of envy-freeness, proportionality and Pareto-optimality. We proved that the CEEI and the Nash-optimal rules are equivalent. Furthermore we showed that the Nash-optimal rule is the only essentially single valued rule in a large family of welfare maximizing rules that is resource monotonic and proportional. Table 3 summarizes the properties of the various division rules featured in this paper. Table 3 : Properties of division rules presented in this paper. Table 4 shows the properties that are satisfied by welfare-maximizing rules from a well-studied one-parametric family (Moulin, 2004, , chapter 3):
w p (x) = x p /p when p = 0 w p (x) = ln(x) when p = 0
Axiom absolute-wp-maximizer relative-wp-maximizer PO All All ESV p < 1 (strictly concave) p < 1 (strictly concave) PROP p = 0 (Nash) p ≤ 0 (hyper-concave) RM p ≤ 1 (concave) p = 0 (Nash) PM p ≤ 1 (concave) p ≤ 1 (concave) The present paper opens up many interesting research questions.
• We proved the uniqueness of the Nash-optimal rule in the families of welfare-maximizers. We believe that this family, in itself, can be characterized by adding axioms used in the cardinal-welfarism framework, such as anonymity and separability (see chapter 3 of Moulin (2004)). We have not done so since we wanted to keep the present paper focused on the fairness axioms.
• When dividing resources such as time or land, it may be important that the pieces are connected. In an accompanying technical report , we show that when the agents insist on receiving a connected piece, no proportional and Pareto-optimal rule can be either resource-monotonic or population-monotonic. If Pareto-optimality is relaxed to weak-Pareto-optimality, then there exists a resource-monotonic division procedure for two agents and a population-monotonic division rule for n agents.
It is an open question whether there exist proportional resource-monotonic rules for three or more agents with the connectivity constraint.
• Monotonicity properties may prevent some but not all possibilities of strategic manipulation. In this paper we ignored strategic considerations and assumed that all agents truthfully report their valuations. An interesting future research topic is how to ensure monotonicity in truthful division procedures.
• Finally, there are the computational issues of cake cutting. The solutions discussed here are difficult to implement. We were mainly concerned with the theoretical possibilities: which combinations of axioms are feasible and which are not. We leave the actual design of protocols to future research.
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